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Abstract of MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER
An examination of the military-media relationship and it's affect on military operations. The paper starts with a brief review of this relationship during significant points in U.S. ii All of us know the power of the pen (and the television camera) and how it creates and shapes perceptions through the manner in which the "facts" are reported. To ignore the potential benefits and the potential disasters that can be produced by the media is not an option in modern day military operations. Military leaders must understand how the media works, what their goals are, their sensitivities, and why we need them. This paper will not examine Constitutional First Amendment rights of freedom of the press and all of its implications. There is no argument that the press has a right to report and the public has a right to know. The paper will focus on the aspects of the military-media relationship that affect the operational commander and influence his planning and decision making process.
CHAPTER II
MILITARY -MEDIA RELATIONS: CIVIL WAR TO VIETNAM Over the years, the relationship between the military establishment and the media could be described as contentious; a relationship filled with deeply rooted suspicions and prejudices, discoveries of improper conduct and periods of strained communication and cooperation. I do not intend to delve too deeply into why this is so. Suffice it to say that the military and the media have always been at odds over many topics of importance: freedom of information, censorship, fiscal responsibility, and so forth. However, the modern military commander must understand and learn from the past (both mistakes and successes) how the relationship with the media affects military operations. CIVIL WAR. At the time of the United States Civil War, the technology of the day had advanced to the degree that news of the war's progress was able to be collected from the battlefields and disseminated to the public at speeds far greater than experienced before. Unwittingly, the press, with few restrictions imposed upon it, passed information on vital military capabilities and intentions to the enemy. 1 The Battle of Manassas was greatly influenced by information the South received from the press in that they were alerted to an I1. John W. Sergeant, "Freedom of the Press: A Challenge to the Operational Commander," Newport: Naval War College, June 1988.
impending attack and where it was to occur. The resultant outcome was a defeat for the North. General William T.
Sherman on the subject of news reporters said, "Never had an enemy a better corps of spies than our army carries along, Concerns for operational security, safety of the troops going ashore, and the attendant safety and logistical burdens incurred by the needs of the press corps were his justification for total media exclusion.
As expected, the media establishment was outraged. Cries of infringement on their Constitutional right to free press rang throughout the country leading to an news campaign which sought, overall, to discredit the actioas of the military in Grenada and the policies of the Reagan Administration. Additionally, ground rules were drawn up that required security reviews of media obtained material before its release. While this limitations produced some carping, overall the media was happier being able to cover the operation in some form than having no access whatsoever.
PANAMA.
If the press pool system in the Persian Gulf could be deemed a definite step forward toward advancement of better media relations with the military, then the Panama operation was a step backward. The two major dtficiencies identified were: 1) Late activation of the media pool leading to late arrival of media reps on scene, and 2) General lack of detailed public affairs planning resulting in problems such as transportation delays, safety and security risks to both media and escort personnel, missed opportunities to get to breaking news or combat action, and delays (communications limitations and security review) in filing reports. The Panama experience led many members of the press to believe that media pool concept was nothing more than a convenient tool enabling the -Extensive use of media pools to manage the media personnel/equipment onslaught while still providing them access to the troops and the stories from the field.
-Cable News Network (CNN) reporter Peter Arnett filing reports from the "enemy" camp in Baghdad, Iraq. constantly evolved throughout the campaign) included:
-Accrediting, registering, and issuing appropriate press credentials to each journalist.
-Coordinating and arranging media visits to units in the field.
-Screening all news stories and pictures as part of the security review process in accordance with the news media "ground rules" (see appendix A).
-Arranging itineraries and escorting senior U.S.
military, U.S. congressional, and Arab leadership. 2. Expand the role and responsibilities of the PAO. As history has shown, efforts to deal with the media are normally relegated to the "back burner" in favor of the more operationally significant issues such as employment, logistics, and strategy planning. But history also shows that shunning the media produces unfavorable press which damages morale, public opinion, and ultimately the military operation.
Get the PAO involved and integrated into the planning process.
His part of the operation cannot stand alone and will require 
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD GROUND RULES
The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:
(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalian," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group."
Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."
(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.
(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming form the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or"North Arabian Sea."
Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.
(4) Rules of engagement details.
(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.
(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. ThiL would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.
(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land-or carrier-based.
(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.
(11)
Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angle of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive manervers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.
(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel lossed of specfic U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provide tactical advantage the the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as Ilight," "moderate," or "heavy." APPENDIX II GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.
Night Operations --Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens.
No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.
Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases.
At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.
Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film, or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.
To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, provided they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units.
U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.
For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:
(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.
(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined soley for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative.
If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief.
The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.
(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.
